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Xu Chen, Damon Berry and William Grimson
 
School of Electrical Engineering Systems, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland
Abstract— The related and often challenging topics of 
identity management and access control form an essential 
foundation for e-health infrastructure. Several approaches and 
supporting specifications for electronic healthcare record 
system (EHR-S) communication have been proposed by 
research projects and standards development organizations in 
recent years. For instance, part four of the CEN TC251 
EN13606 EHRcom standard and the HL7 Role Based Access 
Control Draft Standard for Trial Use have helped to specify 
the nature of access control behaviour in relation to EHR 
communication within and between healthcare organisations. 
Access control services are a core component not only of the 
integrated care EHR-S but also for other information systems 
in the e-health domain. To underpin functionality of this type 
in a distributed environment, it is necessary to provide access 
to scalable, secure and uniform ID domains for users and 
patients.  
This paper considers the use of part four of the EHRcom 
standard in the context of the availability (or lack thereof) of 
national identification systems for patients and for users of an 
integrated care EHR-S. This work begins with a brief 
summary of the state-of-the-art in identity management and 
access control in the health domain and a description of 
approaches that could lead to a secure and interoperable 
identification mechanism. To address the identification 
problem, the authors describe well known EHR access control 
viewpoints that are compatible with the CEN standard for 
EHR communication, EN13606 and describe how an 
identification service can support this functionality. 
Keywords— Electronic Healthcare record system, Identity 
management, ID domain, EHRcom standard, Access control 
I. INTRODUCTION  
We live in a mobile civilization with free movement of 
citizens between cities and towns and across many national 
boundaries. Patients visit different public and private 
medical institutions to get treatment for different medical 
conditions, and are increasingly referred by primary 
physicians to various specialists in a process known as 
shared care. The modern day health process must cope with 
the effects of this mobility. Therefore a growing need for 
the sharing of health care information has arisen and it has 
become the part of health informatics strategy in many 
countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two 
introduces a state of the art on identity management and 
access control for health information and attempts to answer 
whether there is a strong need for national identification 
systems in order to support shared care on a regional or 
national scale.  Section three discussed several popular 
access control ―viewpoints‖ for access to health 
information. Section four gives a brief introduction to 
EHRcom - the European and ISO standard for EHR 
communications and also summarizes the security 
requirements associated with access to health information. 
Section five proposes the idea of integrated EHR system 
and interaction with large-scale regional national system. 
II. PATIENT IDENTIFICATION AND IDENTIFIERS 
The effective exchange of health care information to 
support shared care depends upon rapid, usable and accurate 
electronic health-care record identification and this will not 
be implemented with efficiency unless there is a shared 
identification system.  
A. National Identifier and Health Identifier Systems 
With the evolution of the discipline of health informatics, 
there has been drive to leverage information technology to 
deliver high quality and cost effective health care, leading to 
increased productivity and enhanced patient safety [1]. In 
the meantime, the effective and efficient exchange of 
health-care information has also been proposed and 
requested from different geographical organisations such as 
hospital, general practitioner practice or physician. 
However, the exchange of health information within and 
between health enterprises has long been problematic. 
Today in many countries, the absence of a national 
identifier has meant that healthcare organizations must 
develop their own identification systems and separate 
identification domains. Many of these systems use the same 
or similar trait attributes to help the identification process 
(e.g., patient name, date of birth) but the information may 
not be stored in identical formats at participating healthcare 
sites. In order to allow IDs from the numerous ID domains 
to be matched, in the worst case scenario the resulting 
mapping problem would need to be solved for every pair of 
sites, resulting in the classic n-squared/2 mapping problem.  
This situation is simplified if each site could refer to a 
national identifier domain. By simplifying the process of 
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linking identifiers at different health sites, unique national 
identifiers facilitate the integration of health information. 
The resulting multi-site access to historical and other health 
information represents an important enhancement of 
healthcare quality and a major step towards a regional EHR 
system.  
The adoption of a single standard identifier should also 
lead to more efficient processes and improved patient 
safety. If a unique identifier is independently introduced and 
is not just an extension of an existing number, it may avoid 
recognized problems from earlier identifier systems. For 
these reasons, it is important that the scope of intended use 
of the identifier is carefully considered. 
Clearly, a unique national identifier would serve many 
purposes in e-health. In particular it is expected that a 
national health identifier would enhance the provision of 
quality health care services by facilitating the accurate and 
rapid identification and compilation of an individual’s 
health records. An independently assigned identifier would 
require the creation of a new system for assigning and 
maintaining the numbers as well as separate technology 
infrastructure and administrative structures so the 
development and implementation would require a huge 
investment. Nevertheless, the positive attributes are still 
leading those of negative side on the basis of many 
countries’ experience [2]. 
B. Existing identity management service specifications 
It has been noted above that communication between 
health care information systems is the key to securing closer 
co-operation in a shared care setting, improving handling of 
patients in terms of quality and continuity of care and 
patient safety. To ensure that health care professionals have 
access to information about an individual patient by 
different privilege division of work, several standard 
specifications to support identity management have been 
developed over the last few years. A brief summary of some 
of the main innovations in identity management follows. 
The Person Identification Service (PIDS) is a service 
specification that has been adopted by the Health Domain 
Taskforce of the Object Management Group (OMG) [22] 
for managing identities of persons within a particular 
domain. The PIDS standard includes an interface that 
supports the ability to connect multiple PIDS 
components/servers together in a federated manner. These 
PIDS components were designed and validated for 
interoperability with a variety of pre-existing person-model 
and record-format standards though healthcare. This was to 
ensure that the specification could permit most preexisting 
person identifier management systems and interfaces to 
participate as members of a complex integration 
environment. 
Entity Identification Service (EIS) [23], under a joint 
agreement between HL7 and OMG, the Healthcare Services 
Specification Project (HSSP) has sought to provide to a 
mechanism to develop standard specifications to support the 
improved provision of health care. The Entity Identification 
Service (EIS) is one of the constituent services of the HSSP 
which provides a set of service interfaces to uniquely 
identify various kinds of entities (e.g. people: patients, 
providers etc., devices) within disparate systems within a 
single enterprise and/or across a set of collaborating health 
organizations. 
The EIS specification could be seen as a superset of 
PIDS, and in the Authors’ view it is moving in the right 
direction which is more powerful and flexible use of 
identification of abstracted entities rather than the single 
patients. However, EIS specification is still work in 
progress at time of writing. 
Integrating the Health Enterprise (IHE) PIX/PDQ 
Profiles, Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise is aimed at 
stimulating integration of healthcare information resources 
and IHE technical framework. IHE have defined several 
profiles for interdepartmental communication [3].  
Patient Identifier Cross-referencing (PIX) [24] provides 
cross-referencing of patient identifiers from multiple Patient 
Identifier Domains by supporting the transmission between 
an identity source to the PIX manager and correlating 
information about a single patient from sources that know 
the patient by different identifiers [4] has described the 
relationship between the interfaces specified in the IHE PIX 
profile and a implementation of a master patient index and 
how to link to identity domains.  
Patient Demographics Query (PDQ) [24] supports the 
distributed applications to query a central patient 
information server and retrieve the patients’ demographics 
information (such as when and how to search or visit the 
information). 
NHS Personal Demographics Service (PDS) is part of 
the NHS Care Record Service which supports access control 
and identity management in the United Kingdom [5] [6]. 
The demographic information will be form part of each 
person’s electronic NHS Care Record. The PDS is the 
national electronic demographic service and it allows a 
patient to be identified by NHS staff. The PDS it is hoped 
will provide secure, efficient and convenient access to 
demographic information for 50 million patients in UK [25] 
within the NHS Connecting for Health Initiative which in 
turn is part of the National Programme for IT [26]. 
 In many cases, patients’ demographic and identity 
information is stored local databases from where it can only 
be accessed within the same organization or geographical 
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area. This can result in delays in identifying a patient, 
accessing their correct medical information or even in 
providing treatment. Becker has noted that the specification 
and development of the NHS SPINE and the Personal 
Demographics Service [25], is quite open leaving room for 
differing and therefore possibly conflicting interpretations 
[7]. 
C. Identifying the health professional health organization 
and other actors in the care process 
The primary identity in the health care process is the 
subject of care. However, identification and identifiers are 
also needed to categorize and uniquely identify a long list of 
other roles in the health process including EHR authorship 
committal and attestation, responsible health professionals, 
the associated health care organizations and health care 
units, diagnostic devices and pharmaceutical products. All 
of these entities play a part in establishing an EHR system 
in which the main protagonists are ―clearly visible‖. It is 
likely that EIS will support identification of these parties at 
the service level while ISO OIDs [8] can be utilized with 
the appropriate standardization of domains, to provide 
hierarchical identification for health organizations and units 
as well as information sources and devices. 
III. MULTIPLE VIEWS ON ACCESS CONTROL 
Access to a paper chart is obviously constrained to those 
individuals who can because of their roles, pick up the 
chart. Access is limited by the nature of the medium. The 
electronic health record is intended to be shared widely to 
the right persons but unless care is taken, access could be 
much wider. Of course the record needs to be accessed in 
order for health professionals to do their job, but there are 
sensitivities which need to be considered. Whiddett, R [9] 
investigated the attitudes of patients to disclosure of health 
information and found that patient’s responses varied. As 
one would expect, respondents were more accepting of 
sharing of less sensitive data and anonymised data with only 
6% of respondents permitting sharing of sensitive data with 
other government departments, while 70% agreed to share 
sensitive health information with doctor or nurse. The study 
identified general denial with specific consent [10] as an 
appropriate access control approach to answer the concerns 
of respondents. 
Two basic mechanisms underpin access to an electronic 
health record. Authentication the ―...process of reliably 
identifying security subjects by securely associating an 
identifier and its authenticator...” [11] Authorization the 
process of granting rights for access to information 
resources [12]. 
Blobel [13] has described an interesting series of model 
viewpoints which can be used when considering access to 
health information from different perspectives. These model 
viewpoints are summarized below. 
The domain viewpoint allows information resources to be 
grouped into communication domains that share an agreed 
security policy. Domains can be aggregated into super-
domains or broken into sub-domains. 
The policy viewpoint facilitates a range of different 
policy types. For instance authorization policies contain sets 
of permitted actions; event-based obligation policies define 
actions which must be performed when certain conditions 
are met; refrain policies declare actions the subjects must 
not perform; delegation policies define which authorizations 
can be delegated and to whom. 
The role viewpoint allows privileges to be indirectly 
assigned to users as individuals are given roles and roles are 
associated with a set of privileges. This separation allows 
privileges associated with a role to be updated without 
needing to modify the role membership. 
The document viewpoint, Processes, entity roles, etc. 
must be documented and signed expressing the particular 
relations between entities and processes. The combination 
of processes and relations leads to multiple signatures (e.g. 
in the case of delegation) [13]. 
The privilege management viewpoint is used by ISO 
PMAC specification and it allows the system authority to 
assign the privilege to individual actors or to groups of 
individual actors which can be a human user, a system or 
application etc., and playing the closed role to role 
viewpoint [14].  
The authorization viewpoint, used by OMG RAD 
specification and authorization logic is encapsulated within 
an authorization facility that is external to the application. In 
order to perform an application-level access control to 
clinical object, an application requests an authorization 
decision from such a facility and enforces that decision [27].   
The control viewpoint, illustrates how control is exerted 
over access to a sensitive object operation [15]. 
The delegation viewpoint, a source authority can delegate 
to certain delegation administrators the privileges to create 
and manage the identity management for an authorization 
entity [12]. 
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Fig. 1 Different model viewpoints on access control [14][15] 
Three principal variations on the access control model 
have been widely used commercially: the discretionary 
access control (DAC) in which access is determined by the 
system rather than the owner and is the basis for access 
control on UNIX and Linux, mandatory access control 
(MAC) which is often employed within database 
management systems, and role-based access control 
(RBAC) [13]. RBAC is probably the most popular access 
control scheme in use today and controls collections of 
permissions relating to everything from complex operations 
such as an e-commerce transaction, to simple as read and 
write operations. 
RBAC separates the user from specific authorization, in 
the design of RBAC, the user must have the authority to 
adopt specific roles to be set, so different abstract 
descriptions of the licensing authority can be made to easily 
specify a different role in the collection for each user and 
give users different levels of the most detailed collection of 
authority. In addition, it reduces the amount of 
administrative work needed to add or delete users. 
Despite being the most popular access control scheme 
RBAC alone is probably not sufficient for providing a 
comprehensive and satisfactory access control solution for a 
working shared electronic health record. For example as 
Becker [7] points out, the security and confidentiality 
requirements as described in the NPfIT output-based 
specification OBS and subsequent documentation “are 
highly challenging and beyond the capabilities of current 
access control technologies including role-based access 
control (RBAC).” 
Other access control schemes have been described for the 
health domain. Identity based access control (IBAC) Gaute 
M. [16] also means that, regardless of where or when an 
individual appears on the network, policy appropriate for 
that individual can be enforced. In addition, policy based on 
the individual means that non-trusted users can be prevented 
from accessing the network even though they connect 
through a seemingly legitimate connection point. Identity-
based access control makes it possible for mobile users to 
roam throughout the network, and yet continue to have the 
appropriate access to the resources based on business need. 
Process Based Access Control (PBAC) [13] is an 
authorization system where each (web) service publishes a 
list of operations that it can perform and PBAC determines 
which operations can be called by each user in different 
contexts. 
The information distance model applies increased 
restrictions depending on the ―information distance‖ 
between the information and an actor who seeks to interact 
with it. The originator (subject of care) is ―closest‖ followed 
by the producer (author/interpreter) of the information next 
comes the administrator (user) of information. 
Lovis et. Al [17] described zones of medical 
responsibility and physical location to indicate medical 
responsibility and therapeutic relationships which can 
supplement more general role assignment so that the EHR 
of subjects of care who enter the care flow of a particular 
heath unit can be accessed by HCPs with appropriate roles 
within that health care unit. 
Distribution rules define the behavior of an access 
control component, and the attributes of an access control 
policy can be categorized into who, when, where, why and 
how. Sucurovic [18] indicated that for the purposes of 
calculating access control decisions the attributes governing 
access across these categories can be processed using 
logical AND operations, while attributes within a single 
category can be processed using logical OR operations.  
The progress towards the electronic health record has led 
to a significant ―fading of boundaries‖ between health 
information systems [19]. Among the basic functionality 
requited to support this trend, it is necessary to provide 
integrated identity management and access control facilities. 
IV. IDENTITY AND ACCESS CONTROL FEATURES OF AN EHR 
SYSTEM 
A number of EHR research projects have developed sets 
of requirements electronic health record architectures. These 
requirements have been refined into the ISO technical 
specification 18308 Requirements for an electronic health 
record architecture [20] which is being revised at time of 
writing. The ISO work has suggested that apart from the 
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management of clinical information, an EHR system must 
provide integrated support for recording the main 
identifying traits for the subject of care. It should also 
provide support for unique identification of authors and 
other users of the EHR as well as supporting informed 
consent and audit trails and not least various forms of access 
control. 
A. CEN TC251 prEN13606 EHRcom 
One recent piece of standardization by the ―EHRcom‖ 
project team of CEN Technical Committee 251 has sought 
to fulfill the ISO requirements. This standard is called 
prEN13606 - ―EHRcom‖. This is a five part standard which 
defines and describes various critical aspects of the 
exchange of electronic healthcare records. EHRcom consist 
of five parts: 
1. The reference model 
2. Archetype interchange specification 
3. Reference archetypes and term lists 
4. Security requirement and distribution  rules 
5. Exchange model 
The prEN13606 EHR standard is intended to support 
sharing of health records on a regional or national scale 
ultimately leading to a shared national EHR system. 
EHRcom supports the two-level modeling approach which 
is intended to make health information systems more 
adaptable and more under the control of domain experts 
through the use of archetypes.  
The five parts of EHRcom are mostly complete at time of 
writing and are at various stages of the CEN-ISO 
standardization process and will incorporate a 
representation of EHR access policies which are dealt with 
in part 4 of the standard which also deals with EHRcom 
defines a representation for EHR access policies which were 
introduced in part 4. A large number of EHR-specific 
medico-legal and ethical requirements are also expressed 
within ISO TS 18308. The following are those security 
requirements that apply most specifically to part 4 of the 
standard [21]. An electronic health record architecture such 
as EHRcom should support,  
 citizens’ right of access to EHRs 
 citizens’ ability to incorporate and record information in 
EHRs 
 an audit trail of exchange processes, 
 the labeling of the whole and/or sections of EHRs 
 privacy and confidentiality restrictions 
 retrieval,  recording and tracking the status of access  
 recording all consent with the  associated time frames 
 measure to define, attach, modify and remove of access 
rights for whole EHR section 
 measures to enable and restrict access to whole EHR 
section with access rules 
 measures to separately control authorities to add/modify 
the EHRs from the control of authorities to access the 
EHR 
 recording of an audit trail of access to and 
modifications of EHR access privilege  
 recording the access and/or modification of EHRs 
 storage and retrieval of whole EHR information, the 
minimum requirement is to allow for the recording of 
the data on disclosures and consent 
V. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
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A shared EHR system requires supporting components at 
both a national level at each EHR ―site‖. In the proposed 
system, regional EHR-S services while supporting 
archetype repositories and terminology services would 
provide access to registers of identities for patients 
(Regional Health Identity Service) and health professionals 
(Regional HCP Identity service) Each EHR-S site would 
have access to these regional resources. In addition to the 
clinical information services at each EHR-S site local 
identity services would support the mapping of the local 
patient and health care provider identities to the regional 
equivalents. 
The portal of proposed system, is a web-based 
application that integrates various services (such as 
terminology service and health identity service as shown in 
Figure 2) provided by multiple hospitals and other medical 
organizations. The feature of web service based services is 
that these services exposes their interfaces as web services 
and the portlet communicates with the backend service via 
SOAP which enables the interoperability. An end user, such 
as a patient or doctor, uses a web browser to the portal 
server. The portal server displays a webpage, namely, portal 
interface to the user. The portlets inside each portal 
interface correspond to a collection of correlated services 
provided by medical organizations (such as national HCP 
identity service corresponding to HCP registration portlet). 
The system will provide a uniform and easy-to-use 
interface to users by hiding implementation details of 
services and their providers. It also enables remote services 
which will be instantiated to the correspond portlet. These 
portlets will be definitely under control of security 
mechanisms and these access control policies will be 
produced by an access control engine which gathers certain 
policy data from the LDAP server.  
The portlet container provides a runtime environment for 
portlets to be instantiated, used and finally destroyed. The 
separation of portal interfaces from portlets allows portal 
administrators to easily customize the source of services 
using a content management system.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
There is no doubt that the provision of secure widely-
shared patient records which can nevertheless only be 
appropriately accessed by the right health professionals at 
the right time is a complex goal which requires complex 
solutions. One solution could be considered as a composite 
of identity management and access control to support record 
communication using prEN13606 EHRcom. 
In addition to a problems associated with the integration 
of legacy systems including the harmonization of access 
control approaches and linking of identity domains to 
support interoperability between clinical information 
systems there are numerous access control issues which 
general solutions have yet to be found including 
identification of medical devices and pharmaceutical 
products, health organizations or units. The system 
proposed in this paper attempts to provide a general 
architecture for identity management and access control to 
support national-level EHR-S corresponding to the back-
end regional EHR service.  
Although the prEN13606 EHRcom are still being 
developed by the health informatics community, the authors 
will explore further and implement the prototype system 
based on identity management and access control to 
facilitate the procedures of national EHR-S development. 
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